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RETURN TO GENEVA: 
A COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF MEASURES 
 
by Graham S. Pearson 
 
Introduction 
 
1. The Fifth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 
opened in Geneva on 19 November 2001 and was adjourned on Friday 7 December until 11 
November 2002.  The Interim Report1 records that: 
 
33.  At its sixth plenary meeting on 7 December 2001, the Conference decided by 
consensus to adjourn its proceedings and reconvene at Geneva from 11 to 22 
November 2002. 
 
2.   The reason for the adjournment was the absence of agreement on how to take forward 
various proposals to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention regime.   
Although proposals were made by the European Union, the United States and other States 
Parties for measures to strengthen the regime there was no agreement as to how best to give 
further consideration to these proposals.   It was also evident that almost all the States Parties 
continued to support the mandate for the Ad Hoc Group to consider measures "to strengthen 
the effectiveness and improve the implementation" of the Convention whilst, in contrast, the 
United States had proposed language “that the Ad Hoc Group and its mandate are hereby 
terminated….” 
 
3.   It is important that the Fifth Review Conference when it resumes in November 2002 
should both successfully conclude with a Final Declaration, that reaffirms the norms and 
extended understandings that have been developed during the previous Review Conferences, 
and agree a process that continues to strengthen the BTWC regime during the interval until 
the Sixth Review Conference.  It is therefore timely that States Parties should, as Nicholas 
Sims has argued in Review Conference Paper No. 52, be considering now how to achieve a 
successful outcome from the resumed Fifth Review Conference. 
 
4.   The launch on 29 April 2002 by the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary of a Green Paper 
which "discusses UK priorities and the next steps ahead of the reconvened BTWC Fifth 
Review Conference and invites comments on the proposals outlined here and on any other 
ideas for strengthening the Convention" was therefore welcomed as a valuable and timely 
contribution to the preparations by States Parties for the resumed Fifth Review Conference in 
November 2002.   Review Conference Paper No. 63 examined the UK Green Paper and 
analysed the proposals identified in the paper.  This analysis noted that the Green Paper 
limited its consideration to measures which have been identified by the UK, its EU partners, 
                                                 
1United Nations, Fifth Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Interim Report, BWC/CONF.V/12, 14 December 2001.  Available at http://www.opbw.org 
2Nicholas A. Sims, Return to Geneva:  The Next Stage of the BTWC Fifth Review Conference, University of 
Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Review Conference Paper No. 5, April 2002.  Available at 
http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
3Graham S. Pearson, Return to Geneva:  The United Kingdom Green Paper, University of Bradford, 
Department of Peace Studies, Review Conference Paper No. 6, June 2002.  Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/ 
acad/sbtwc 
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the US and academics in a number of countries and did not allude to the fact that several of 
the measures identified were also supported by other States Parties in their statements at the 
Fifth Review Conference in November 2001.   It also did not mention other measures 
proposed by other States Parties at the Review Conference even though the Green Paper after 
identifying the five areas for specific action then refers to the other measures identified in the 
Green Paper and says that “the UK is ready to examine these and any others that may serve 
to counter the threat.”   The analysis concluded that in considering the forthcoming resumed 
Review Conference there would be significant benefit to be gained from creating a 
comprehensive list of the measures proposed to the Fifth Review Conference as this could 
then attract support from many States Parties as being a list that should be reviewed and taken 
further at a meeting subsequent to the Review Conference.   
 
5.  This Review Conference Paper takes this forward by creating and examining a 
comprehensive list of the measures proposed by States Parties at the Fifth Review Conference 
in November/December 2001 either in their statements or in the proposals put forward as 
Working Papers to the Committee of the Whole. 
 
The measures proposed to the Fifth Review Conference in November/December 2001 
 
6.   The months leading up to the start of the Fifth Review Conference on 19 November 2001  
saw the events of 11 September followed by the subsequent anthrax attacks in the United 
States which resulted in five deaths.   World attention was focussed on countering terrorism 
and the United Nations Secretary-General in his address4 to the General Assembly on 1 
October 2001 said that:   
 
"While the world was unable to prevent the 11 September attacks, there is much we 
can do to help prevent future terrorist acts carried out with weapons of mass 
destruction.  The greatest danger arises from a non-State group -- or even an 
individual -- acquiring and using a nuclear, biological or chemical weapon.  Such a 
weapon could be delivered without the need for any missile or any other sophisticated 
delivery system. 
 
In addition to measures taken by individual Member States, we must now strengthen 
the global norm against the use of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.  This 
means, among other actions: 
 
-- Redoubling efforts to ensure the universality, verification and full 
implementation of key treaties relating to weapons of mass destruction, 
including those outlawing chemical and biological weapons and the nuclear 
non-proliferation treaty; 
 
-- Promoting cooperation among international organizations dealing with 
these weapons; 
 
-- Tightening national legislation over exports of goods and technologies 
needed to manufacture weapons of mass destruction and their means of 
delivery; 
                                                 
4United Nations, Secretary-General, Addressing Assembly on Terrorism, Calls for 'Immediate, Far-Reaching 
Changes' in the UN Response to Terror, SA/SG/7977, GA/9920, 1 October 2001.  Available at 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sgsm7977.doc.htm 
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-- Developing new efforts to criminalize the acquisition or use of weapons of 
mass destruction by non-State groups. 
 
The Fifth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) 
opening on 19 November 2001 was thus well timed to enable the States Parties to respond to 
these calls. 
 
7.  In addition, the United States put forward proposals to strengthen the Convention in a 
Presidential statement5 issued on 1 November 2001 which stated that "The United States is 
committed to strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) as part of a 
comprehensive strategy for combating the complex threats of weapons of mass destruction 
and terrorism." and went on to propose that '...all Parties: 
 
• Enact strict national criminal legislation against prohibited BW activities with 
strong extradition requirements; 
 
• Establish an effective United Nations procedure for investigating suspicious 
outbreaks or allegations of biological weapons use; 
 
• Establish procedures for addressing BWC compliance concerns; 
 
• Commit to improving international disease control and to enhance mechanisms for 
sending expert response teams to cope with outbreaks; 
 
• Establish sound national oversight mechanisms for the security and genetic 
engineering of pathogenic organisms; 
 
• Devise a solid framework for bioscientists in the form of a code of ethical conduct 
that would have universal recognition; and 
 
• Promote responsible conduct in the study, use, modification, and shipment of 
pathogenic organisms. 
 
8.  At the Review Conference, there was widespread expectation that a strong Final 
Declaration would be agreed together with an agreement that the States Parties would meet 
again in 2002 in order to consider further how to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the 
implementation of the Convention.   The Review Conference was close to agreement when 
late on the afternoon of the final day, Friday 7 December 2001, the United States tabled 
language proposing the termination of the Ad Hoc Group and its mandate -- to strengthen the 
effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Convention.  The Review Conference 
consequently adjourned until 11 November 2002. 
 
9.  The States Parties should be engaged now in preparing for the resumption of the Fifth 
Review Conference and seeking an agreed way forward.  However, should agreement not be 
                                                 
5The White House, Statement by the President:  Strengthening the International Regime against Biological 
Weapons, 1 November 2001,  Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/ print/20011101. 
htm 
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forthcoming, States Parties will need to consider whether to vote6 in order to move matters 
forward and avoid a complete failure of the Review Conference.   In April 2002, the United 
Kingdom issued a Green Paper7 entitled "Strengthening The Biological And Toxin Weapons 
Convention: Countering The Threat From Biological Weapons" which identified a range of 
the measures that could be deployed to strengthen the Convention and discusses UK priorities 
ahead of the resumed Fifth Review Conference.  
 
10.  However, the Green Paper makes no allusion to the fact that the UN Secretary-General  
and a number of other States Parties in their statements8 made in the General Debate of the 
Fifth Review Conference spoke in support of proposals that are essentially similar to those 
put forward by the US and the EU.    These included the following: 
 
Supported Measure State Party 
National legislation needs to be tightened UN S-G 
Acquisition or use of biological weapons needs to be criminalized UN S-G 
Provision of assistance should prevention fail UN S-G 
Strengthen existing international disease control and response Japan 
Universality needs to be encouraged Canada  
Iran 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Pakistan 
Russia 
Switzerland 
Enhanced confidence-building measures New Zealand 
Effective compliance machinery to make it much harder to cheat New Zealand 
Strengthened legally-binding confidence-building measures Canada 
Timely and complete submission of confidence-building measures Russia 
International cooperation in the provision of assistance India  
Ukraine 
Institutional arrangements to combat bioterrorism Ukraine 
Strengthened moral and legal norms India 
Enhanced national controls on dangerous pathogens India 
Withdrawal of Geneva Protocol reservations Mexico 
An international legal instrument to criminalize activities prohibited 
by the Convention 
Switzerland 
 
11.  In addition, the Green Paper makes no mention of other proposals made to the Fifth 
Review Conference.  In particular, South Africa made specific proposals9 for amendments to 
the existing CBMs "A" -- the declaration of maximum containment facilities -- and CBM "G" 
-- the declaration of vaccine production facilities -- extending coverage to animal and plant 
pathogen facilities as well as for a new CBM "H" for declaration of plant inoculant and 
                                                 
6Nicholas A. Sims, Return to Geneva: The Next Stage of the BTWC Fifth Review Conference, University of 
Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Review Conference Paper No. 5, April 2002.  Available at http://www. 
brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
7United Kingdom, Strengthening The Biological And Toxin Weapons Convention: Countering The Threat From 
Biological Weapon, The Stationery Office, Cm 5484, April 2002.  Available at http://www.fco.gov 
8These statements are available at http://www.opbw.org 
9South Africa, Strengthening Confidence-Building Measures, BWC/CONF.V/COW/WP.1, 16 November 2001.  
Available at http://www.opbw.org 
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biocontrol agent production facilities.  New Zealand made proposals10 that the Review 
Conference should establish an enhanced process of accountability through annual meetings 
of States Parties and identify other means by which we might work further on compliance 
options, including the possibility of subsidiary bodies or an Oversight Committee.  Korea11 
said that the idea of establishing some kind of intersessional mechansim to strengthen the 
follow-up process deserves serious consideration by States Parties.  Japan12 proposed that the 
States Parties should meet frequently during the intersessional period and supported the idea 
of a strong follow-up mechanism in whatever format ... or an annual meeting of the States 
Parties.  Both South Africa13 and Brazil14 noted that Article 14 of the draft Protocol contained 
provisions that could guide States Parties in future actions regarding the full operation of 
Article X whilst Pakistan15 stressed the importance of full implementation of Article X.  
China16 said that "the enhancement of international cooperation is the only way to effectively 
meet the challenges of global security and to realize comprehensive and lasting security."  
The omission from the Green Paper of a specific measure addressing "technical assistance 
and technical cooperation" is surprising as this was identified by the EU in its statement17 as 
being one of the measures that will need to be detailed further in work after the Review 
Conference.  It is, however, noted in the Green Paper in the context of investigations into 
non-compliance that a free-standing agreement on such investigations would not be easily 
negotiated “unless it also contained some scientific and technological assistance elements.” 
Canada18 proposed a regular forum that would at least provide an annual opportunity for 
States Parties to convene, with oversight supplemented by scientific and legal expert study 
                                                 
10Clive Pearson, Statement by the New Zealand Ambassador for Disarmament Mr Clive Pearson before the 
Review Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, 19 November 2001. 
Available at http://www.opbw.org 
11Chung Eui-Yongm, Statement by Ambassador Chung Eui-Yongm, Permanent Representative of the Republic 
of Korea, at the Fifth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Geneva, 20 November 2001. Available at http://www.opbw.org 
12Toshio Sano, Statement by Mr. Toshio Sano, Representative of the Delegation of Japan at the Fifth Review 
Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Geneva, 19 November 
2001. Available at http://www.opbw.org 
13Peter Goosen, Statement by Peter Goosen, Chief Director: Peace and Security, Department of Foreign 
Affairs, Pretoria, Geneva, 19 November 2001.  Available at http://www.opbw.org  
14Celina M. Assumpcao de Valle Pereira, Statement Ambassador Celina M. Assumpcao de Valle Pereira,  Fifth 
Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production 
and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Geneva, 19 
November to 7 December 2001. Available at http://www.opbw.org 
15Abdul Basit, Statement by Mr. Abdul Basit, Acting Permanent Representative at the Fifth Review Conference 
of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Geneva, 19 November 2001. 
Available at http://www.opbw.org 
16China, Statement by Ambassador Sha Zukang Head of Chinese Delegation at the 5th Review Conference of 
the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Geneva, 19 November 2001. 
Available at http://www.opbw.org 
17Belgium, Statement by Belgium on behalf of the European Union, 19 November 2001.  Available at http:// 
www.opbw.org 
18Christopher Westdal, Statement by His Excellency Christopher Westdal, Ambassador and Permanent 
Representative to the Conference on Disarmament, The Fifth Review Conference of the States Parties to the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) 
and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Geneva, 19 November 2001. Available at http://www.opbw.org 
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groups, as appropriate.  India19 proposed that transfer of dual-use materials for medical, 
diagnostic and treatment purposes should be regulated on the basis of guidelines to be 
negotiated and accepted by all States Parties and that these guidelines should prohibit  
transfers to non-State actors.  Norway20 proposed that there was a clear need to strengthen the 
support functions of the Convention with the aim of ensuring more regular meetings of the 
States Parties and other intersessional work.  Norway also supported the proposal to include 
terrorism and public health in a future legally binding mechanism.    This additional list of 
proposals could thus be summarised as follows: 
 
Proposed Measure State Party 
Specific extensions to CBMs A & G and new CBM H South Africa 
Enhanced accountability through annual meetings New Zealand 
Regular annual meetings of subsidiary bodies and/or an Oversight 
Committee 
Canada  
Japan 
Korea 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Article X implementation Brazil 
China 
EU 
Pakistan 
South Africa 
Guidelines to ensure strengthening of Article III and to prohibit 
transfers of dual-use materials to non-State actors 
India 
Inclusion of terrorism and public health in a future legally-binding 
mechanism 
Norway 
 
12.  Further expressions of support and suggestions were made by the States Parties in 
proposals made to the Committee of the Whole21.  These can be tabulated as shown below: 
 
Proposals made to the Committee of the Whole 
 
 COW/WP No Proposal State Party 
 COW/WP.1 Strengthened CBM A & G and new CBM H South Africa 
 COW/WP.2 Art I -- includes reaffirmationof S & T China 
 COW/WP.3 Art III emphasises importance of balance with 
Article X 
China 
 COW/WP.4 Art IV -- new viewpoints and proposals on 
strengthening of domestic legislation -- support 
China 
                                                 
19Rakesh Sood, Statement by Ambassador Rakesh Sood, Head of Delegation to the Fifth Review Conference of 
the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Geneva, 19 November 2001. 
Available at http://www.opbw.org 
20Sverre Bergh Johansen, Statement by H.E. Sverre Bergh Johansen, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of 
Norway to the United Nations Office in Geneva, Geneva, 20 November 2001. Available at http://www 
.opbw.org 
21The Working Papers submitted by the States Parties to the Committee of the Whole at the Fifth Review 
Conference are available at http://www.opbw.org 
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 COW/WP No Proposal State Party 
 COW/WP.5 Art V -- new ideas and proposals concerning CBMs 
-- support 
China 
 COW/WP.6 Art XIV -- promotion of universality Libya 
 COW/WP.7 Art X -- promotion of fullest possible exchange Libya 
 COW/WP. 8 Art X -- promotion including disease surveillance 
and proposing specific measures 
Australia 
France 
Italy 
 COW/WP.9 Art X -- various proposals China + 6 
 COW/WP.10 Preamble -- Universality NAM + 
Other 
 COW/WP.11 Art I -- prohibition of use NAM + 
Other 
 COW/WP.12 Art X -- various proposals NAM + 
Other 
 COW/WP.13 Work of the Ad Hoc Group NAM + 
Other 
 COW/WP.14 Art I -- establishment of Scientific Advisory Panel 
Art I -- educational programme on BW supported 
Art IV -- national criminal legislation supported 
Art IV -- strict regulations on pathogens supported 
Art IV -- oversight of high-risk experiments 
Art V -- enhanced CBMs and clarification supportd 
Art VII & X -- strengthened global disease & surv 
Intersessional meetings to discuss strengthening  
Japan 
 COW/WP.15 Art IX reaffirms effective prohibition of CW Canada 
Poland 
 COW/WP.16 Preamble -- terrorism Argentina 
Australia 
 COW/WP.17 Art I -- primarily same language as at Fourth Rev C 
Art III 
Art IV -- proposed national criminal legislation 
Art IV -- standards for security of pathogens 
Art IV -- genetic engineering oversight 
Art IV -- professional code of conduct 
Art V -- reiteration of compliance issue procedures 
Art V -- elaboration of investigations of suspicious 
disease outbreaks and/or alleged biological 
incidents 
Art VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, XII, XIV & XV 
Art XII -- Intersessional meeting to assess progress 
in implementing new measures adopted at the Fifth 
Review Conference and new mechanisms to strengt 
USA 
 COW/WP.18  Art VIII -- withdrawal of Geneva Protocol reservns Russia 
 COW/WP.19 Reservation of right to retaliate is incompatible Brazil + 3 
 COW/WP.20 Art I -- strengthened reaffirmation for S & T Chile 
 COW/WP.21 Art IX requires updating Pakistan 
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 COW/WP No Proposal State Party 
 COW/WP.22 Art IV -- including legal assistance Canada 
Switzerland 
 COW/WP.23 Art I -- establishment of Scientific Advisory Panel 
Art I -- educational programmes to raise awareness 
Art II 
Art III -- voluntary notification of transfers annual 
Art IV -- national penal legislation & standards 
Art IV -- national approval of genetic engineering 
Art V -- database of CBM returns 
Art V -- extension of CBM B, E & G 
Art V -- mandatory CBM E & G 
Art V -- clarification of CBM returns & visits 
Art X -- enhanced epidemiol prevention & surveill 
Art VI, VII, VIII, XI 
EU 
 COW/WP.24 Art XV Iraq + 4 
 COW/WP.25 Art III transfer denial procedures (AHG/WP.432) China + 7 
 COW/WP.26 Art X -- apply Cartagena Protocol principles to 
transfers 
Mexico 
Peru 
 COW/WP.27 Art V -- use procedures to address compliance 
concerns 
Libya 
 COW/WP.28 Intro, Preamble, Art I -- pests and vectors -- ethnic 
Art III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII - withdrawal of Geneva 
Protocol reservations, IX, XII 
Iran 
 COW/WP.29 Art I, III -- Cartagena Protocol procedures, IV -- 
criminal legislation & extradition, VI -- integrated 
approach to implementation of Cartagena Protocol 
& BTWC, VII -- safety standards, national 
oversight of genetic engineering, code of conduct, 
IX -- no gaps between CWC & BTWC, X -- global 
disease monitoring & surveill, worldwide biosafety 
standards 
Mexico 
 COW/WP.30 Accelerate universalization of the Convention 
Enhance confidence-building measures 
Strengthen the Convention nationally & internation 
More frequent meetings of States Parties 
Australia 
Canada 
New Zealand 
 COW/WP.31 Art X -- establish Cooperation Committee to meet 
annually 
NAM + 
Other 
 
13.  From this it is possible to create a comprehensive list of measures made up from those in 
the UK Green Paper, those proposed by States Parties in their statements to the Review 
Conference and those proposed by States Parties in their working papers submitted to the 
Committee of the Whole.   This comprehensive list is in the following tabulation: 
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Analysis of proposals in the UK Green Paper, in States Parties statements and in Papers 
submitted to the Committee of the Whole 
 
Proposed Measure Green 
Paper 
Statement COW 
Proposal 
Revised CBMs with specific extensions to particular 
CBMs 
√ Canada 
EU 
New Zealand 
Russia 
South Africa 
UK 
Australia 
Canada 
New Zealand 
China 
EU  
South Africa 
Investigations into non-compliance (alleged use, misuse 
of facilities, suspicious outbreaks) and effective 
compliance machinery to make it much harder to cheat 
√ UK 
US 
EU 
USA 
Assistance in the event of, or threat of, use of BW √ UN S-G 
India  
UK 
Ukraine 
 
National criminal legislation and extradition √ UN S-G 
UK 
US 
 
Canada 
China 
Japan 
Mexico 
Switzerland 
USA 
A new Convention on Criminalization of CBW √ UN S-G 
Switzerland 
 
Enhanced national controls on dangerous pathogens √ India 
US 
 
EU 
Japan 
USA 
A new Convention on Physical Protection of dangerous 
pathogens 
√   
Regular annual meetings of subsidiary bodies and/or an 
Oversight Committee 
 Canada  
Japan 
Korea 
New Zealand 
Norway 
UK 
EU 
Japan 
USA 
Scientific Advisory Panel √  Japan 
Increase efforts on disease surveillance, detection and 
diagnosis and countering infectious disease generally 
√ Japan 
UK 
US 
 
Australia 
France  
Italy 
China 
Libya 
Mexico 
Japan 
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Proposed Measure Green 
Paper 
Statement COW 
Proposal 
Article X implementation  Brazil 
China 
EU 
Pakistan 
South Africa 
Libya 
NAM + 
Other 
Oversight of genetic engineering  USA 
 
EU 
Japan 
Mexico 
USA 
Codes of conduct for professional bodies √ USA 
 
Japan 
Mexico 
USA 
Actively promoting universal membership of the BTWC √ Canada  
EU 
Iran 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Pakistan 
Russia 
Switzerland 
Australia 
Canada 
New Zealand 
Libya 
Withdrawal of reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol √ EU 
Mexico 
Brazil + 3 
EU 
Iran 
Russia 
USA 
Guidelines to ensure strengthening of Article III and to 
prohibit transfers of dual-use materials to non-State actors 
 India  
Cartagena Biosafety Protocol for transfers  ------ Mexico 
 
14.  In Review Conference Paper No. 6 the analysis showed that all these measures could 
usefully be considered in order of the increasing amount of negotiation that they were likely 
to require for agreement.   For this Review Conference Paper, the following comprehensive 
list of measures in order of increasing amount of negotiation is used: 
 
Proposed Measure State 
Actively promoting universal membership of the BTWC Australia 
Canada 
EU 
Iran 
Libya 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Pakistan 
Russia 
Switzerland 
UK 
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Proposed Measure State 
Withdrawal of reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol Brazil + 3 
EU 
Iran 
Mexico 
Russia 
UK  
US 
Increase efforts on disease surveillance, detection and diagnosis and 
countering infectious disease generally 
Australia 
China 
France 
Italy 
Japan 
Libya 
Mexico 
UK 
US 
Codes of conduct for professional bodies Japan 
Mexico 
UK 
US 
National criminal legislation and extradition UN S-G 
China 
Japan 
Mexico 
Switzerland 
UK 
US 
Enhanced national controls on dangerous pathogens EU 
India 
Japan 
UK 
US 
Oversight of genetic engineering and high-risk experiments EU 
Japan 
Mexico 
US 
Revised CBMs with specific extensions to particular CBMs Australia 
Canada 
China 
EU 
New Zealand 
Russia 
South Africa 
UK 
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Proposed Measure State 
Regular annual meetings of subsidiary bodies such as a Scientific 
Advisory Panel and/or an Oversight Committee 
Canada 
EU 
Japan 
Korea 
New Zealand 
Norway 
UK 
US 
Assistance in the event of, or threat of, use of BW UN S-G 
India 
UK 
Ukraine 
US 
A new Convention on Criminalization of CBW UN S-G 
Switzerland 
UK 
A new Convention on Physical Protection of dangerous pathogens UK 
Article X implementation Brazil 
China 
EU 
Libya 
NAM 
Pakistan 
South Africa 
Investigations into non-compliance (alleged use, misuse of facilities, 
suspicious outbreaks) and effective compliance machinery to make it 
much harder to cheat 
EU 
UK 
US 
Guidelines to ensure strengthening of Article III and to prohibit transfers 
of dual-use materials to non-State actors 
EU 
India 
Voluntary annual notification of authorised transfers EU 
Use of Cartagena Biosafety Protocol advanced informed agreement 
provisions for transfers of living modified organisms 
Mexico 
Peru 
 
 
The Effective Strengthening of the Biological Weapons Convention 
 
15.  It is timely to consider now, prior to the resumed Review Conference, how best the 
effective strengthening of the Biological Weapons Convention could be achieved.   In this 
analysis attention will be focussed on a technical assessment of the potential measures in the 
comprehensive list above, their effectiveness and their associated burden, together with a 
comparison being made to the measures in the Chemical Weapons Convention regime which 
has been in force now for over five years.    For each measure, a short summary table is 
provided which makes a comparison with the CWC, evaluates the burden and provides an 
overall assessment.   Such comparisons with the CWC are valid as there is, and rightly so, a 
deliberate overlap between the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical 
Weapons Convention in that both conventions address toxins and all toxic substances 
produced by living organisms even when they are actually produced by synthesis.  The two 
Conventions therefore have a significant area of overlap, both have general purpose criteria 
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which embrace all possible agents, past, present and future, and both address dual use 
materials and technology.   
 
Classical 
     CW
     Industrial 
Pharmaceutical 
     Chemicals
 Bioregulators 
     Peptides Toxins
Genetically 
   Modified 
       BW
Traditional 
      BW
Cyanide 
Phosgene 
Mustard 
Nerve Agents
Aerosols Substance P 
Neurokinin A
Saxitoxin 
Ricin 
Botulinum Toxin
Modified/ 
Tailored 
Bacteria 
Viruses
Bacteria 
Viruses 
Rickettsia 
 
Anthrax 
Plague 
Tularemia
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
Chemical  Weapons  Convention
Poison Infect
 
 
It is now evident22 that chemistry and biology are coming closer together and that we are 
faced with a continuum -- after all biological agents are actually chemicals.   The CWC 
regime is indeed the one of greatest relevance to the BTWC regime and the most appropriate 
one for comparison.  
 
16.   The measures in the comprehensive list are considered in turn in order of increasing 
negotiation required for implementation. 
 
17.  Actively promoting universal membership of the BTWC.   Universality of the 
Convention is highly desirable.  At the Fourth Review Conference, the Article XIV section of 
the Final Declaration included the following: 
 
2. The Convention calls upon States which have not yet ratified or acceded to the 
Convention to do so without delay and upon those States which have not signed the 
Convention to join the States Parties thereto, thus contributing to the achievement of 
universal adherence to the Convention. 
 
3. In this connection, the Conference requests States Parties to encourage wider 
adherence to the Convention. 
 
4. The Conference particularly welcomes regional initiatives that would lead to wider 
accession to the Convention.  
 
18.  It is regretted that the Depositaries of the BTWC did not take advantage of the 
opportunity that arose at the Millennium Summit in 2000 when the UN Secretary-General 
                                                 
22See for example, Graham S. Pearson, New Scientific and Technological Developments of Relevance to the 
Fifth Review Conference, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Review Conference Paper No. 
3, July 2001. Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
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wrote23 to Heads of State and Government to advise them that special facilities would be 
provided for Heads of State or Government to add their signatures to any treaty or convention 
of which the Secretary-General is the depositary and to encourage them, in particular, to sign 
25 core treaties24 -- which included five disarmament treaties including the CWC and the 
CTBT.  Some 85 States took advantage of the opportunity provided by the Millennium 
Summit.  
 
19.  In considering how to encourage the universality of the BTWC as well as of the Geneva 
Protocol and the CWC as well as the withdrawal of reservations to the Geneva Protocol, there 
is much to be said for the preparation and publication of regional comparative tabulations 
showing signature and accessions to the BTWC, to the CWC and to the Geneva Protocol as 
well as the status of the outstanding reservations to the Geneva Protocol.   This would require 
the co-Depositaries of the BTWC -- the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the 
United States -- to approach France as the Depositary of the Geneva Protocol and the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations as the Depositary of the CWC to propose that the 
Department of Disarmament Affairs in the UN should annually prepare and publish these 
regional comparative tables. As an example, such a tabulation for the countries of the 
ASEAN Regional Forum prepared for a seminar in Seoul, South Korea in December 2001 
was as follows: 
                                                 
23UN Secretary-General, Letter to Heads of State or Government, 15 May 2000.  Available at http://untreaty 
.un.org/English/millennium/law/sgletter.htm 
24Available at http://untreaty.un.org/English/millennium/law/treaties.htm 
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ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Membership of Geneva Protocol, BTWC and CWC 
 
 
Country 
 
Geneva 
Protocol 
Reservation 
to  
Geneva 
Protocol 
Biological 
and Toxin 
Weapons 
Convention 
Chemical 
Weapons 
Convention 
Australia √  √ √ 
Brunei ?  √ √ 
Cambodia √ Reservation √ Signatory 
Canada √  √ √ 
China √ Reservation √ √ 
DPRK √ Reservation √ ? 
India √ Reservation √ √ 
Indonesia √  √ √ 
Japan √  √ √ 
Laos √  √ √ 
Malaysia √  √ √ 
Mongolia √  √ √ 
Myanmar   ?  Signatory Signatory 
New Zealand √  √ √ 
Papua New Guinea √ Reservation √ √ 
Philippines √  √ √ 
Republic of Korea √ Reservation √ √ 
Russia √  √ √ 
Singapore ?  √ √ 
Thailand √  √ Signatory 
USA √ Reservation √ √ 
Vietnam √ Reservation √ √ 
 
20.  Promotion of universality could best be tackled together by a concerted effort involving 
the co-depositaries for the BTWC, the depositary for the 1925 Geneva Protocol and also the 
depositary for the CWC, as well as the OPCW with the objective being to increase the 
universality of the BTWC, the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the CWC together with the 
withdrawal of reservations from the 1925 Geneva Protocol.    Awareness should first be 
raised by preparation of regional comparative tabulations showing which States have yet to 
accede or to withdraw their reservations.  This should then be followed by a concerted effort 
to provide States not party with a model package of documentation providing examples of 
how accession to the relevant Convention or Protocol can be communicated to the relevant 
Depositary and, likewise, withdrawal of reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol can be 
communicated.   This package should also be supplemented by model legislation that could 
be used by the State concerned in enacting its national implementing legislation.   The 
initiative should also be backed by an offer of technical and financial assistance to enable the 
individual State concerned to take the necessary actions nationally and internationally to 
accede to the Convention or Protocol and to withdraw their reservations from the 1925 
Geneva Protocol. 
 
21.  The overall assessment for this measure can be summarised as follows: 
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Measure CWC comparison Burden on legitimate 
activities 
Assessment 
Actively promoting 
universal 
membership of the 
BTWC 
Parallel applies Slight as requires action 
by government 
Benefits from all 
States being Party to 
the BTWC -- and the 
other relevant treaties 
 
 
22.  Withdrawal of reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol.   The Article VIII section of 
the Final Declaration25 of the Fourth Review Conference noted that: 
 
7. The Conference notes that reservations concerning retaliation, through the use of 
any of the objects prohibited by the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, even 
conditional, are totally incompatible with the absolute and universal prohibition of 
the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition and retention of bacteriological 
(biological) and toxin weapons, with the aim to exclude completely and forever the 
possibility of their use. 
 
and called upon all States Parties "that continue to maintain pertinent reservations to the 
1925 Geneva Protocol to withdraw those reservations, and to notify the Depositary of the 
1925 Geneva Protocol of their withdrawals without delay."  
 
23.  As noted above, the withdrawal of reservations from the Geneva Protocol should be 
tackled together by a concerted effort involving the co-depositaries for the BTWC, the 
depositary for the 1925 Geneva Protocol and also the depositary for the CWC, as well as the 
OPCW.   The objective should be to increase the universality of the BTWC, the 1925 Geneva 
Protocol and the CWC together with the withdrawal of reservations from the 1925 Geneva 
Protocol.     States not party should be provided with a model package of documentation 
providing examples of how accession to the relevant Convention or Protocol can be 
communicated to the relevant Depositary and, likewise, withdrawal of reservations to the 
1925 Geneva Protocol can be communicated.    
 
Measure CWC comparison Burden on legitimate 
activities 
Assessment 
Withdrawal of 
reservations to the 
1925 Geneva 
Protocol 
Parallel applies Very slight as requires 
action by government 
Removal of legal 
inconsistencies 
 
24.  Increase efforts on disease surveillance, detection and diagnosis and countering 
infectious disease generally.  The UK Green Paper rightly notes that "this would be done 
through existing national and/or international efforts" i.e. via the WHO, FAO and OIE and 
furthermore emphasises that "the overall framework within which any action plans were 
pursued would need to be clear."  There is no doubt that improved national strategies for 
ensuring human, animal and plant health through disease surveillance and countering 
outbreaks of disease harmonized internationally through the WHO, FAO and OIE 
programmes will bring benefits to all States Parties.   It is primarily through benefits to 
                                                 
25United Nations, Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Final Declaration, BWC/CONF.IV/9, Geneva, 1996. 
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national infrastructure and increased transparency that there are potentially, over times, 
benefits from building confidence in compliance.   There are also potential benefits in 
reducing the chance that accidental releases or deliberate attacks will go unrecognized.  This 
proposed measures should not require negotiation -- at least, not in the BTWC forum -- to be 
taken forward.  It is, however, worth recognising that there would be merit in action being 
taken internationally to promote the universality of adhesion to the WHO (which has 191 
Member States), to the UN FAO (which has 183 Member States but not Russia) and to the 
OIE (which has 157 Member States). 
 
Measure CWC comparison Burden on legitimate 
activities 
Assessment 
Increase efforts on 
disease surveillance, 
detection and 
diagnosis and 
countering infectious 
disease generally 
No CWC parallel Slight  Potential benefits in 
reducing the chance 
that deliberate attacks 
would not be 
recognised - 
however, after failure 
of regime 
 
25.  Codes of conduct for professional bodies.  This is essentially an elaboration of the 
appeals that have long been made by the States Parties at the Review Conferences -- at the 
Fourth Review Conference in 1996, the Final Declaration26 in the section on Article I stated 
that: 
 
8. The Conference appeals through the States Parties to their scientific communities 
to lend their support only to activities that have justification for prophylactic, 
protective and other peaceful purposes, and refrain from undertaking or supporting 
activities which are in breach of the obligations deriving from provisions of the 
Convention. 
 
In addition, an awareness of the prohibitions resulting from the BTWC has also long been 
encouraged by the States Parties at the Review Conferences -- at the Fourth Review 
Conference in 1996, the Final Declaration27 in the section on Article IV stated that the 
Conference notes the importance of: 
 
- Inclusion in textbooks and in medical, scientific and military education programmes 
of information dealing with the prohibitions and provisions contained in the 
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Geneva Protocol of 1925; 
 
An international code of ethics should require little negotiation as this requires States Parties 
to encourage their national professional bodies to adopt such codes of conduct.  There would, 
however, be benefits from States Parties working together to compile some examples of best 
practice and then for a concerted international effort to be mounted by States Parties with 
                                                 
26United Nations, Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Final Declaration, BWC/CONF.IV/9, Geneva, 1996. Available at http://www.opbw.org 
27United Nations, Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Final Declaration, BWC/CONF.IV/9, Geneva, 1996. 
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their national professional bodies to encourage adoption of an appropriate code of conduct 
which should also be promoted internationally through international professional bodies. 
 
Measure CWC comparison Burden on legitimate 
activities 
Assessment 
Codes of conduct for 
professional bodies 
In 2002 OPCW has 
initiated an ethics project  
Slight as primarily action 
for national professional 
bodies 
Over time could 
bring some benefits 
 
26.  National criminal legislation and extradition.  It will be important that States Parties 
do provide information on the texts of specific legislation enacted or other measures taken to 
ensure domestic compliance.  There would be benefit in this information being collated, 
translated and distributed by a small secretariat on a regular basis to all States Parties.  The 
experience with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in which the Technical 
Secretariat of the OPCW has carried out such a collation and analysis of the legislation 
enacted by the States Parties to implement the CWC has clearly demonstrated the value of 
such a collation and analysis as an encouragement to all States Parties to not only implement 
their legislation but also to ensure that it is effective.  There is likewise value in the small 
secretariat providing model legislation to assist States Parties. 
 
Measure CWC comparison Burden on legitimate 
activities 
Assessment 
National criminal 
legislation and 
extradition 
Parallel to CWC  Modest but needed 
nationally for safety & 
security reasons 
Significant benefits 
as makes work on 
biological weapons 
illegal 
 
27.  Enhanced national controls on dangerous pathogens.  There is much to be said in 
support of tighter domestic controls on the use, storage and transfer of pathogens with the 
United States "select agent" programme28 and the United Kingdom The Anti-Terrorism, 
Crime and Security Act 200129 as examples.  Indeed, one of the benefits that was identified as 
arising from the composite Protocol text was that the provisions in Article 14 Scientific and 
Technological Exchange for Peaceful Purposes and Technical Cooperation in Section F 
Cooperative Relationships with Other International Organizations and Among States Parties 
included provision for agreements and arrangements in order to derive the greatest possible 
synergy in, and benefits from: 
 
(vi)  Regulations governing the handling, transportation, use and release of microbial 
and other biological agents and toxins.   
 
It was apparent that over time the building of capacity in member States relating to the 
regulation and control of the handling, use, storage and transfer of biological agents will not 
only build confidence in compliance with the Convention but also bring benefits nationally in 
regard to public health and protection of the environment.  This is an area that needs to be 
                                                 
28An account of the "select agent" programme is provided in Graham S. Pearson, Article X: Some Building 
Blocks, University of Bradford Department of Peace Studies Briefing Paper No. 7, March 1998, para 47-53.  
Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
29United Kingdom, The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001.  Available at http://www.legislation. 
hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2001/20010024.htm 
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developed in conjunction with the ongoing international and regional efforts to harmonise 
biosafety standards and controls around the world. 
 
Measure CWC comparison Burden on legitimate 
activities 
Assessment 
Enhanced national 
controls on 
dangerous pathogens 
 No CWC parallel. 
Toxic chemicals are 
however subject to 
national controls. 
Slight as national 
controls should already 
be in place for health & 
safety reasons 
Significant benefits 
as shows that 
dangerous pathogens 
under control 
 
28. Oversight of genetic engineering and high-risk experiments.  There is already 
considerable attention being paid to the oversight of genetic engineering with particular 
attention being given to those experiments with high risks nationally, regionally and 
internationally.30 For example, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) has long been engaged in the harmonization of regulatory oversight in biotechnology 
with the aim of promoting international harmonization in biotechnology including health and 
safety aspects.   There are indeed benefits to be gained from measures to achieve oversight of 
genetic engineering to international standards as the infrastructure required within States 
Parties to achieve this will, over time, increase transparency and thus contribute to building 
confidence in compliance with the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.  
 
Measure CWC comparison Burden on legitimate 
activities 
Assessment 
Oversight of genetic 
engineering and high-
risk experiments 
No parallel Slight as national 
oversight should already 
be in place for health & 
safety reasons and 
desirable to harmonize to 
international standards 
Over time will 
increase transparency 
and contribute to 
building confidence 
in compliance 
 
29.  Revised CBMs with specific extensions to particular CBMs.  The various proposals 
put forward by the States Parties are quite wide ranging from specific extensions (to CBMs A 
& G, to CBMs B, E & G and a new CBM H) to clarification mechanisms and voluntary visits 
and to making some CBMs (E & G) mandatory.  Some aspects -- such as the modalities for 
the improvement and extension of the CBMs -- should be relatively easy to finalise by an ad 
hoc meeting of scientific and technical experts from States Parties as was done in a two week 
meeting in 1987 to finalise the modalities for the confidence-building measures agreed at the 
Second Review Conference in 1986.  Other aspects relating to revised CBMs -- such as 
voluntary visits and a clarification mechanism and making some mandatory are likely to 
require more negotiation.  There would be merit in agreeing that there should be an ad hoc 
meeting of scientific and technical experts from the States Parties to finalise the modalities as 
far as possible for the revised and extended CBMs and the new CBM H early in 2003.  Any 
aspects that require further negotiation and consideration should be deferred to a subsequent 
meeting. 
 
                                                 
30A detailed survey of national, regional and international requirements is provided in Graham S. Pearson, 
Article X: Some Building Blocks, University of Bradford Department of Peace Studies Briefing Paper No. 6, 
March 1998 and Graham S. Pearson, Article X: Some Building Blocks, University of Bradford Department of 
Peace Studies Briefing Paper No. 7, March 1998.  Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
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30.  The ideas mentioned in the UK Green Paper such as inclusion of an annex on the level of 
information exchanged voluntarily between states as well as possible voluntary visits between 
States Parties to facilities notified under the CBMs are well worthy of consideration.   
However, an essential first step to make real progress is to agree a small secretariat to collate 
and translate the CBMs returns and to issue these to all States Parties.  Such a collation could 
usefully include regional comparative tabulations such as that for the EU circulated by the 
University of Bradford during the Fifth Review Conference and reproduced here for 
information: 
 
EU COMPLIANCE WITH CBMs 
(based on information contained in BWC/CONF.V/2, V/2/Corr.1, V/2/Corr.2 & 
V/2/Corr.3) 
 
Country 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Austria √ √ √ √ √ 
Belgium Patchy ? Patchy Patchy Patchy 
Denmark √ ? ? ? ? 
Finland √ √ √ √ √ 
France √ √ √ √ √ 
Germany √ √ √ √ √ 
Greece ? ? ? ? ? 
Ireland √ ? ? ? ? 
Italy √ √ √ √ √ 
Luxembourg √ √ ? ? ? 
Netherlands √ √ √ √ √ 
Portugal ? ? ? ? ? 
Spain √ √ √ √ √ 
Sweden √ √ √ √ √ 
United Kingdom √ √ √ √ ? 
 
It is interesting to note that the Council of the European Union on 15 April 2002 adopted31 a 
list of concrete measures which included the following: 
 
5.  Timely, consistent and full implementation of reporting obligations imposed either 
by the international instrument or by the final reports of review conferences (..., BWC 
-- CBMs, ...) and the creation of necessary conditions for processing the resulting 
information (e.g. translate and process information coming from BWC -- CBMs in 
usable databases). 
 
31.  There would be further benefits from States Parties also agreeing that this small 
secretariat and any individual State Party could seek clarification from other States Parties of 
the information submitted in their CBM returns.  Together, these two measures could 
transform the effectiveness of the CBMs. 
 
 
 
                                                 
31European Union, 2421st Council Meeting, General Affairs, Luxembourg, 15 April 2 
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Measure CWC comparison Burden on legitimate 
activities 
Overall assessment 
Revised CBMs with 
specific extensions + 
secretariat & 
clarification 
Broad range of BTWC 
relevant activities 
Mandatory under CWC 
Not significantly more 
than at present 
Significant increase 
in benefit over 
present ineffective 
system 
 
32.  Regular annual meetings of subsidiary bodies such as a Scientific Advisory Panel 
and/or an Oversight Committee.   There has long been a compelling argument for the States 
Parties to the BTWC to set up interim supportive institutions which will enable the BTWC 
treaty regime to flourish and achieve its true potential.   The concept of an interim supportive 
institution is not novel as it was considered at the Third Review Conference and narrowly 
missed being established then.   The resources required for such an institution would indeed 
be modest.   The arguments for such interim supportive institutions has been convincingly 
made by Nicholas Sims in the Bradford Review Conference Paper No. 232 distributed to 
States Parties in April 2001 and reiterated in the Article XII section of the University of 
Bradford "Key Points for the Fifth Review Conference".33  It should be possible to agree such 
an interim institution at the resumed Fifth Review Conference by adopting language in the 
Article XII section of the Final Declaration such as that proposed on pages 125 to 127 of the 
"Key Points for the Fifth Review Conference". 
 
Measure CWC comparison Burden on legitimate 
activities 
Assessment 
Regular annual 
meetings of 
subsidiary bodies 
such as a Scientific 
Advisory Panel 
and/or an Oversight 
Committee 
 OPCW has regular 
meetings of States 
Parties (CoSP, ExC) and 
of Scientific Advisory 
Board and 
Confidentiality 
Commission 
Slight  Benefits as would 
enable progress to be 
made in a number of 
areas pending 
eventual creation of 
OPBW 
 
33.  Assistance in the event of, or threat of, use of BW.   Whilst, as the UK Green Paper 
states, it is undoubtedly true that the States Parties could reaffirm and reemphasize their 
existing obligation under the Convention, the effective provision of such assistance could be 
greatly promoted by the creation of a small secretariat which would collate offers of 
assistance from States Parties and serve as a focal point to facilitate their provision in the 
event of attack or serious threat of attack against a State Party.   As noted in the UK statement 
to the Fifth Review Conference the ongoing work in the OPCW provides a clear indication of 
the issues that need to be addressed.  It was noted above that the effective provision of such 
assistance could be greatly promoted by the creation of a small secretariat which would 
collate offers of assistance from States Parties and serve as a focal point to facilitate their 
provision in the event of attack or serious threat of attack against a State Party.   This could be 
incorporated into the remit for the proposed interim supportive institution at the outset or, 
                                                 
32Nicholas A. Sims, The Functions of the BTWC Review Conferences:  Maximizing the Benefits from the Fifth 
Review Conference, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Review Conference Paper No. 2, 
April 2001.  Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
33Nicholas A. Sims & Graham S. Pearson, Article XII: Review Conferences in Graham S. Pearson, Malcolm R. 
Dando & Nicholas A. Sims (eds), Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention:  Key Points for the Fifth 
Review Conference, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, November 2001.  Available at 
http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
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alternatively, the interim supportive institution could establish a subsidiary body to consider 
the provision of assistance and discuss the detailed procedure for assistance so that this could 
be provided on a timely basis when required.  
 
Measure CWC comparison Burden on legitimate 
activities 
Assessment 
Assistance in the 
event of, or threat of, 
use of BW 
Parallel to CWC  Slight although 
preparations would need 
to be made. 
Benefit to all States 
Parties -- however, 
after failure of 
regime 
 
34.   A new Convention on Criminalization of CBW.  The draft Convention to Prohibit 
Biological and Chemical Weapons under International Criminal Law34 developed by the 
Harvard-Sussex programme would complement the prohibitions of the BTWC and the CWC 
as it would make it a crime under international law for any person knowingly to develop 
produce, acquire, retain, transfer or use biological or chemical weapons or knowingly to 
order, direct or render substantial assistance to those activities or to threat to use biological or 
chemical weapons.  The draft convention rightly defines chemical and biological weapons as 
they are defined in the BTWC and the CWC on the basis of the general purpose criterion in 
these conventions. Any person who commits any of the prohibited acts anywhere would face 
the risk of prosecution or extradition should that person be found in the territory of a state that 
supports the proposed convention.  This could be taken forward by one or more States Parties 
taking this draft new Convention to the Sixth Committee of the United Nations General 
Assembly. 
 
Measure CWC comparison Burden on legitimate 
activities 
Assessment 
A new Convention 
on Criminalization of 
CBW 
Would complement both 
the CWC and the BTWC  
Slight as national 
implementation should 
already be in place 
Significant benefits 
as criminalizes work 
on CBW 
 
35.  A new Convention on Physical Protection of dangerous pathogens.  In order to 
consider the feasibility and desirability of a new international agreement that sets standards 
for physical protection, containment measures, operating procedures and transfers nationally 
and internationally, it is necessary to first consider what the existing requirements are 
nationally, regionally and internationally.35  At the international level, the UNEP International 
Technical Guidelines for Safety in Biotechnology36 points out the importance of containment 
in the risk management of biological organisms and modified organisms noting that "the 
degree of containment achieved depends primarily on the type of physical barriers and the 
application of appropriate work procedures."  It also includes "any relevant requirements to 
ensure safe handling, storage, subsequent transport and use" as being part of the information 
                                                 
34The Harvard Sussex Program on CBW Armament and Arms Limitation, The Draft Convention to Prohibit 
Biological and Chemical Weapons under International Criminal Law, November 2001.  Available at http://fas -
www.harvard.edu/~hsp/crim01.pdf 
35A detailed survey of national, regional and international requirements is provided in Graham S. Pearson, 
Article X: Some Building Blocks, University of Bradford Department of Peace Studies Briefing Paper No. 6, 
March 1998 and Graham S. Pearson, Article X: Some Building Blocks, University of Bradford Department of 
Peace Studies Briefing Paper No. 7, March 1998.  Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
36United Nations Environment Programme, UNEP International Technical Guidelines for Safety on 
Biotechnology, UNEP, Nairobi, Kenya, December 1995.  Available at http://www.unep.org/unep/program/ 
natres/biodiv/irb/unepgds.htm 
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to be provided before such organisms are transferred from one country to another.  More 
recently the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity37 
includes requirements for the provision of information that "specifies any requirements for 
the safe handling, storage, transport and use of living modified organisms."  Although the 
Cartagena Protocol focusses on genetically-modified organisms, it is recognised that the 
provisions for safe handling, storage, transport and use of such organisms are based on and 
developed from those for unmodified organisms. In addition the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) has long been engaged in the harmonization of 
regulatory oversight in biotechnology with the aim of promoting international harmonization 
in biotechnology including health and safety aspects. 
 
36.  It is evident that already there is considerable attention being given to the containment of 
biological agents and of genetically modified organisms nationally, regionally (as in the EU) 
and internationally.   Consideration of a new Convention on Physical Protection of dangerous 
pathogens needs to be carefully crafted so as to be complementary to the existing 
regulations.  Indeed, consideration needs to be given whether strengthening of the physical 
protection aspects would be better addressed through the existing international fora under the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, thereby avoiding the risk of possible confusion and 
unnecessary duplication, rather than through a new security convention. 
 
Measure CWC comparison Burden on legitimate 
activities 
Assessment 
A new Convention 
on Physical 
Protection of 
dangerous pathogens 
 No CWC parallel 
 
Slight as national 
controls should already 
be in place for health & 
safety reasons and 
desirable to harmonize to 
international standards 
Benefits as 
dangerous pathogens 
held and transferred 
to international 
standards 
 
37. Article X implementation.  It is evident that the implementation of Article X has 
attracted increased attention in the Final Declarations of successive Review Conferences.38  
The development of national infrastructure in the context of measures for the implementation 
of Article X of the Convention is to be supported as such measures over time will increase 
transparency and thus contribute to building confidence in compliance with the Convention. 
It is suggested that the Article X section of the Final Declaration of the Fifth Review 
Conference should be extended to include additional concepts for the implementation of 
Article X as proposed in subparagraphs 9 to 12 on page 113 of the Bradford "Key Points for 
the Fifth Review Conference".39   The main problem in simply agreeing language in the 
Article X section of the Final Declaration of the Review Conference is that there is little 
                                                 
37Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity.  Available at http://www.biodiv 
.org 
38See Graham S. Pearson, Article X: Exchange of Equipment, Materials and Scientific and Technological 
Information, International Cooperation and Development in Graham S. Pearson, Malcolm R. Dando & 
Nicholas A. Sims (eds), Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention:  Key Points for the Fifth Review 
Conference, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, November 2001.  Available at 
http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
39Graham S. Pearson, Article X: Exchange of Equipment, Materials and Scientific and Technological 
Information for Peaceful Purposes and International Cooperation and Development in Graham S. Pearson, 
Malcolm R. Dando & Nicholas A. Sims (eds), Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention:  Key Points 
for the Fifth Review Conference, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, November 2001.  
Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
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evident implementation during the years between the Review Conferences.  Consequently, 
this is another area in which an interim supportive institution could make a valuable 
contribution by collecting, collecting and issuing to States Parties an annual report on the 
implementation of Article X. 
 
Measure CWC comparison Burden on legitimate 
activities 
Assessment 
Article X 
implementation 
Article XI of the CWC -- 
but much less elaborated 
than BTWC Article X 
proposals 
Slight  Over time will 
increase transparency 
and contribute to 
building confidence 
in compliance 
 
38.  Investigations into non-compliance (alleged use, misuse of facilities, suspicious 
outbreaks) and effective compliance machinery to make it much harder to cheat.  
Investigations into suspected non-compliance are a key measure to strengthen the Convention 
-- and the Green Paper rightly includes misuse of facilities as well as alleged use and 
suspicious outbreaks. A simple extension of the existing UN Secretary-General process -- 
which is limited to instances where the State on whose territory the alleged use has taken 
place -- in respect of both the scope -- to misused facilities -- and the circumstances -- to 
include cases where the State Party where the investigation would take place has withheld its 
consent -- is unlikely to be readily agreed.   Given the background of the Ad Hoc Group 
negotiations -- which have elaborated in exhaustive detail procedures for both facility and 
field investigations -- the viable option would appear to be the negotiation of an international 
agreement which, as the Green Paper rightly notes, should include other elements including 
scientific and technological assistance.   The negotiation of such an international agreement 
should be able to benefit from the previous work carried out by the Ad Hoc Group. 
 
Measure CWC comparison Burden on legitimate 
activities 
Assessment 
Investigations into 
non-compliance --
alleged use, misuse 
of facilities, 
suspicious outbreaks 
Parallel to CWC 
challenge inspection and 
investigation of alleged 
use 
Slight as assumed that 
frivolous investigations 
will be excluded. 
However, preparations 
need to be made. 
Significant increase 
in potential detection 
& deterrence of 
prohibited activities 
 
39.   Guidelines to ensure strengthening of Article III and to prohibit transfers of dual-
use materials to non-State actors.  For convenience, this proposed measure is considered 
along with the other two proposals relating to transfers -- the proposal for voluntary annual 
notification of authorised transfers and the use of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
advanced informed agreement procedures for transfers of living modified organisms 
between States Parties to the BTWC.  It is well known that the control of transfers of 
biological agents and the implementation of Article III of the Convention is one of the most 
contentious issues considered by the States Parties when considering how to strengthen the 
effectiveness of the prohibition regime.  There is more passion generated by this issue and 
much less professional and considered debate and discussion. 
 
40.  This is inconsistent with the reality that States around the world are increasingly 
concerned that no materials that are potentially harmful should be imported into their country 
without their prior knowledge and agreement because of concerns about public health and the 
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environment.  This applies to a wide range of materials whether these are banned and 
severely restricted chemicals -- such as pesticides -- or narcotic drugs and psychotropic 
substances or living modified organisms.  These concerns parallel the security concerns about 
the potential misuse of chemical or biological materials by non-State actors and terrorist 
groups.   It is therefore encouraging that there are signs that some States Parties to the BTWC 
are showing a willingness, however cautiously, to explore this potential common ground in 
regard to biological agents.  Thus, the EU in their proposed language for the Final Declaration 
of the Fifth Review Conference proposed: 
 
The Conference invites States Parties to explore a possible set of common principles 
in the field of export controls to be applied on a voluntary basis. 
 
and that: 
 
Considering the utility of a global overview of international transfers in the current 
context of enhanced vigilance, the Conference invites States Parties to explore the 
possibility of voluntary notification of authorisations of transfers subject to licensing 
on an annual aggregated basis. 
 
These suggestions would appear to mirror some of the provisions that are applied 
internationally to narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.40  The statement made by 
India41 to the Fifth Review Conference said that "We believe that transfer of dual-use 
materials for medical, diagnostic and treatment purposes should be regulated on the basis of 
guidelines to be negotiated and accepted by all States Parties.  Such guidelines should, we 
further believe, prohibit transfers to non-State actors."  The further proposal42 made by 
Mexico and Peru was that: 
 
The Conference recognizes the importance of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to 
the Convention on Biological Diversity, which seeks to contribute to ensuring an 
adequate level of protection in the field of the safe transfer, handling and use of living 
modified organisms..... 
 
The Conference decides that States Parties to the BWC shall apply on an interim 
basis -- whilst the Cartagena Protocol does not enter into force -- provisions 
regarding the Cartagena Protocol's informed agreement procedure applied to 
international transfer of living modified organisms which are bacteriological 
(biological) agents. 
 
41.  Previous Review Conferences have agreed language in the Article III section of the Final 
Declaration -- for example, at the Fourth Review Conference -- which stated that: 
 
2. The Conference notes that a number of States Parties stated that they have already 
taken concrete measures to give effect to their undertakings under this Article and in 
                                                 
40Graham S. Pearson, Further Chemical Control Regimes: Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 
CBWCB Bulletin, No. 51, March 2001, pp.2 - 11. 
41Rakesh Sood, Statement by Ambassador Rakesh Sood, Head of Delegation to the Fifth Review Conference of 
the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Geneva, 19 November 2001. 
Available at http://www.opbw.org 
42Mexico and Peru, Proposal Working Paper by Mexico and Peru, BWC/CONF.V/COW/WP.26, 27 November 
2001.  Available at http://www.opbw.org 
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this context also notes statements made by States Parties at the Conference about the 
legislative or administrative measures they have taken since the Third Review 
Conference. The Conference calls for appropriate measures by all States Parties.  
 
and also stated that: 
 
The Conference affirms that Article III is sufficiently comprehensive to cover any 
recipient whatsoever at international, national or subnational levels. 
 
The Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference also noted that: 
 
The Conference discussed the question whether multilaterally-agreed guidelines or 
multilateral guidelines negotiated by all States Parties to the Convention concerning 
the transfer of biological agents, materials and technology for peaceful purposes to 
any recipient whatsoever might strengthen the Convention. 
 
without reaching any conclusion other than to note that these issues are being considered as 
part of the ongoing process to strengthen the Convention.   
 
42.  It is noted that the onus in Article III of the Convention is clearly placed on the individual 
States Parties as Article III states that: 
 
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to transfer to any recipient 
whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce 
any State, group of States or international organizations to manufacture or otherwise 
acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified 
in article I of this Convention.   
 
The composite Protocol included in Article 7 a Section B entitled "Transfer Guidelines".  
When it is recognized that the States Parties are concerned about the effective implementation 
of Article III and that this is primarily a national responsibility, there are potential benefits 
from considering guidelines to ensure the strengthening of Article III and to prohibit transfers 
to non-State actors as such guidelines should over time improve the implementation of 
Article III.  It needs to be clear, however, that these would simply be guidelines and it would 
be a matter for individual States Parties to determine whether or not to adopt these guidelines 
-- or a lesser or higher standard -- nationally. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Measure CWC comparison Burden on legitimate 
activities 
Assessment 
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Guidelines to ensure 
strengthening of 
Article III and to 
prohibit transfers of 
dual-use materials to 
non-State actors.  
Convention specifies 
controls relating to 
transfers of scheduled 
chemicals 
Modest as similar 
controls are required 
increasingly to address 
exports and imports of 
potentially dangerous 
materials 
Benefits to States 
Parties from 
improved 
implementation of 
Article III 
 
Conclusions 
 
43.  In preparing for the forthcoming resumed Fifth Review Conference there would be 
significant benefit to be gained from the States Parties considering a comprehensive list of the 
measures proposed by States Parties in their statements to the Fifth Review Conference or 
working papers to the Committee of the Whole with proposed language for the Final 
Declaration as such a list should attract support from many States Parties as being a list that 
should be reviewed and taken further at a meeting subsequent to the Review Conference.  
This comprehensive list of measures could, with advantage, be developed and agreed by the 
Western Group in advance of the resumption of the Review Conference and the opportunity 
should be taken to see whether the Eastern Group would be willing to be associated with the 
comprehensive list.   The list should be tabled by Australia on behalf of the Western Group as 
a Working Paper for the resumed Review Conference.  
 
44.  The comprehensive list of measures considered in this paper can usefully be summarised 
in a table in which the measures that require little or no negotiation -- such as the promotion 
of universality of the Convention -- are listed first and then subsequent measures in order of 
the amount of negotiation43 likely to be required up to measures such as the guidelines for 
transfer controls. 
 
The Comprehensive List of Measures proposed by States Parties in November 2001 in 
increasing order of the likely amount of negotiation required to agree the measure 
 
Measure CWC comparison Burden on legitimate 
activities 
Assessment 
Actively promoting 
universal 
membership of the 
BTWC 
Parallel applies Slight as requires action 
by government 
Benefits from all 
States being Party to 
the BTWC -- and the 
other relevant treaties 
Withdrawal of 
reservations to the 
1925 Geneva 
Protocol 
Parallel applies Very slight as requires 
action by government 
Removal of legal 
inconsistencies 
                                                 
43The amount of negotiation likely to be required for individual measures is considered in the analysis section on 
pages 30 to 37 of Graham S. Pearson, Return to Geneva: The United Kingdom Green Paper, University of 
Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Review Conference Paper No. 6, June 2002.  Available at http://www. 
brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
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Measure CWC comparison Burden on legitimate 
activities 
Assessment 
Increase efforts on 
disease surveillance, 
detection and 
diagnosis and 
countering infectious 
disease generally 
No CWC parallel Slight  Potential benefits in 
reducing the chance 
that deliberate attacks 
would not be 
recognised - 
however, after failure 
of regime 
Codes of conduct for 
professional bodies 
In 2002 OPCW has 
initiated an ethics project  
Slight as primarily action 
for national professional 
bodies 
Over time could 
bring some benefits 
National criminal 
legislation and 
extradition 
Parallel to CWC  Modest but needed 
nationally for safety & 
security reasons 
Significant benefits 
as makes work on 
biological weapons 
illegal 
Enhanced national 
controls on 
dangerous pathogens 
 No CWC parallel. 
Toxic chemicals are 
however subject to 
national controls. 
Slight as national 
controls should already 
be in place for health & 
safety reasons 
Significant benefits 
as shows that 
dangerous pathogens 
under control 
Oversight of genetic 
engineering and high-
risk experiments 
No parallel Slight as national 
oversight should already 
be in place for health & 
safety reasons and 
desirable to harmonize to 
international standards 
Over time will 
increase transparency 
and contribute to 
building confidence 
in compliance 
Revised CBMs with 
specific extensions + 
secretariat & 
clarification 
Broad range of BTWC 
relevant activities 
Mandatory under CWC 
Not significantly more 
than at present 
Significant increase 
in benefit over 
present ineffective 
system 
Regular annual 
meetings of 
subsidiary bodies 
such as a Scientific 
Advisory Panel 
and/or an Oversight 
Committee 
 OPCW has regular 
meetings of States 
Parties (CoSP, ExC) and 
of Scientific Advisory 
Board and 
Confidentiality 
Commission 
Slight  Benefits as would 
enable progress to be 
made in a number of 
areas pending 
eventual creation of 
OPBW 
Assistance in the 
event of, or threat of, 
use of BW 
Parallel to CWC  Slight although 
preparations would need 
to be made. 
Benefit to all States 
Parties -- however, 
after failure of 
regime 
A new Convention 
on Criminalization of 
CBW 
Would complement both 
the CWC and the BTWC  
Slight as national 
implementation should 
already be in place 
Significant benefits 
as criminalizes work 
on CBW 
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A new Convention 
on Physical 
Protection of 
dangerous pathogens 
 No CWC parallel 
 
Slight as national 
controls should already 
be in place for health & 
safety reasons and 
desirable to harmonize to 
international standards 
Benefits as 
dangerous pathogens 
held and transferred 
to international 
standards 
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Measure CWC comparison Burden on legitimate 
activities 
Assessment 
Article X 
implementation 
Article XI of the CWC -- 
but much less elaborated 
than BTWC Article X 
proposals 
Slight  Over time will 
increase transparency 
and contribute to 
building confidence 
in compliance 
Investigations into 
non-compliance --
alleged use, misuse 
of facilities, 
suspicious outbreaks 
Parallel to CWC 
challenge inspection and 
investigation of alleged 
use 
Slight as assumed that 
frivolous investigations 
will be excluded. 
However, preparations 
need to be made. 
Significant increase 
in potential detection 
& deterrence of 
prohibited activities 
Guidelines to ensure 
strengthening of 
Article III and to 
prohibit transfers of 
dual-use materials to 
non-State actors.  
Convention specifies 
controls relating to 
transfers of scheduled 
chemicals 
Modest as similar 
controls are required 
increasingly to address 
exports and imports of 
potentially dangerous 
materials 
Benefits to States 
Parties from 
improved 
implementation of 
Article III 
 
43.  The  analysis of all these measures in this paper shows that these measures would in 
general not incur an unnecessary burden on legitimate activities yet they would bring benefits 
to the States Parties to the BTWC.  It is also evident that an interim supportive institution or 
bureau would be immensely beneficial in helping to nurture and sustain the Convention 
between Review Conferences and could be highly effective in taking forward several of the 
proposed measures.  The States Parties at the resumption of the Fifth Review Conference on 
11 November 2002 are urged to use such a comprehensive list of measures to strengthen the 
Convention as the basis for an agreement to take these forward through negotiation at 
meetings subsequent to the Review Conference supported by an interim supportive institution 
or bureau. 
 
 
  
